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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of political instability in Latin America. In 
a panel of 18 Latin American countries from 1971 to 2000, we find that democratic 
countries experience less average instability in the region, indicating that the move to 
increased democracy in the last couple decades may alleviate the persistent problem of 
instability in the area.   We also find that income inequality and ethnic fractionalization 
are important determinants of instability.  Countries with low levels of inequality also 
suffer less instability on average, while ethnic diversity has a non-linear effect on 
instability.  Many macroeconomic variables commonly thought to bring about political 
instability, such as inflation and high budget deficits, are not significantly correlated with 
instability in our sample.  Only openness to trade has a significant negative effect on 
political instability.  Only openness to trade has a significant negative effect on political 
instability  
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I. Introduction 
 
Ranked as the third most unstable region in the world in the post-war era, political  
instability has been a pervasive problem in Latin America.1  In our sample of 18 Latin 
American countries from 1971-2000, there were 20 coups d’etat, 451 political 
assassinations, 217 riots, and 113 crises that threatened to bring down the sitting 
government. 2  Only three Latin American countries were consistently democratic over 
the thirty year period:  Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela.3  All of the rest of the 
countries switched from a democracy to an autocracy (or vice versa) at least once. In 
sum, political instability is a persistent and pernicious problem in the region.4   
Given the many studies that document the negative relationship between instability 
and capital accumulation  (Alesina & Perotti (1996); Alesina et.al. (1996)), it is likely that this 
instability has hampered economic development in the region.  In this paper, we seek to uncover 
the factors behind this instability.  In a  
In this paper we analyze the determinants of political instability in a panel of 18 
Latin American countries from 1971 to 2000.  Not only is Latin America an interesting 
region to study because of it’s unusually persistent problems with instability, but focusing 
on a small sample helps us to avoid potential problems with pooling data from a large set 
of very different countries.5  We find three main interesting results:  First, regime type is 
a significant determinant of instability in the area.  Countries with higher democracy 
scores also have lower average political instability, which indicates that recent moves to 
increased democracy in the region may bring about less instability in the future.  This 
result is tempered though by our finding that long lived democracies have a greater 
chance of experiencing instability than equally long lived autocracies.  Second, we find 
that income inequality and ethnic fractionalization are both important factors behind 
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instability.  Countries with low (or high) levels of inequality have less average instability 
than countries with average levels of inequality, and ethnic fractionalization has a non-
linear effect on political instability.  Increases in ethnic fractionalization lower instability 
until a certain level of diversity, at which point any increases in diversity are associated 
with higher political instability.   Third, we find that many of the macroeconomic 
variables included in our estimation (including the level and standard deviation of 
inflation and government budget deficit) are only weakly significant at best.  Only lagged 
values of trade openness and investment are helpful in explaining current political 
instability.   
Section II discusses why political instability is important to overall economic 
development, while section III investigates the determinants of instability.  Section IV 
discusses the results of our estimation, and section V concludes with a brief discussion of 
the policy implications of our findings. 
 
II.   Why Political Instability Is Important 
 Political instability hinders economic development through its effect on the 
accumulation of physical and human capital.6  Investments are often difficult to reverse, 
which means that investors will postpone new capital projects until the policy 
environment clarifies.7  Pindyck & Solimano (1993) originally argued that economic 
instability, in the form of high inflation, is more damaging to new investment, than 
political instability.  Since then, however, many other papers in the literature have found 
political instability to be equally harmful.  Collier (1999) shows that under extreme cases 
of political instability, such as civil war, a country’s existing capital stock will suffer 
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from both the physical destruction and the general neglect during wartime.  Investors will 
delay all new capital investments and either resort to purely speculative activities or 
move their money abroad.8   
 Most empirical studies of the effects of political instability investigate the 
relationship between instability and economic growth.  For instance, Alesina et.al. 
(1996), in a sample of 113 countries from 1950 to 1982, analyze the joint determination 
of political instability and per-capita GDP growth and find that instability has a negative 
and significant effect on growth rates.  
Several other papers specifically test the relationship between political instability 
and investment rates or productivity.  Barro (1991) finds that instability negatively affects 
economic growth and investment and argues that property rights are not enforced in 
politically unstable environments.  Alesina & Perotti (1996) show that political instability 
has a negative effect on investment in a sample of 70 countries from 1960 to 1985.   
Venieris & Gupta (1983) confirm their results using a different sample of countries and 
time period.  Edwards (1998) and Berthélemy & Söderling (2001), however, both report 
either statistically weaker or mixed empirical results.  Edwards, in a panel of 93 countries 
from 1960 to 1990, finds a negative, but relatively weak, relationship between instability 
and productivity growth.  Berthélemy & Söderling show that coups d’etat and revolutions 
negatively and significantly affect investment rates in Sub-Sahara Africa, although the 
finding is not robust to the inclusion of productivity measures.9
 Political instability can also depress the accumulation of human capital.  Maloney 
(2002) argues that endemic political instability in Latin America may have been one of 
the major reasons why countries in the region have low levels of human capital.  
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However, the empirical evidence that instability lowers human capital accumulation is 
not definitive.  In one of the few papers that test the relationship between the two, 
Fedderke & Klitgaard (1998) distinguish between “regime-threatening” and “non-regime 
threatening” political instability and find that only the former is negatively related to 
education levels.   
Besides a direct effect on the accumulation of physical and human capital, 
political instability can have detrimental effects on the policymaking environment and 
governance in general.  Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya (2005) argue that “governments in 
politically unstable and polarized countries are more likely to adopt inefficient or sub-
optimal policies, including the maintenance of inefficient tax systems, higher current 
government consumption, or the accumulation of larger external debts, which, in turn, 
adversely affect long-run economic growth.”  Chief executives who are politically 
vulnerable are less likely to undertake necessary, but unpopular, economic reforms.   
Likewise, Kaufmann & Kraay (2002) argue that good governance has a positive 
effect on per-capita income growth, and that one of the components of good governance 
is low political instability.10  The reason for instability’s inclusion in the definition of 
governance is that “the quality of governance in a country is compromised by the 
likelihood of wrenching changes in government, which not only has a direct effect on the 
continuity of policies, but also at a deeper level undermines the ability of all citizens to 
peacefully select and replace those in power” (p. 177). They go on to argue that Latin 
American countries have low levels of governance in comparison to other regions of the 
world, and that the economic growth in the region has come without an improvement in 
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governance. In the section below, we discuss our measure of political instability and 
some of the factors which may help to explain the prevalence of instability in the region. 
 
III. An Empirical Model of Political Instability  
We construct a measure of political instability using data from the Cross National 
Time Series Data (Banks (2005)).  Because there are so many different types of 
instability, we begin by creating three categories of instability: the first includes all  
events which pose a major threat to the political and economic system at the national 
level such as coups, revolutions, and government crises; the second consists of events 
that reveal citizen discontent with the political system, such as general strikes, riots, and 
anti-government demonstrations; and the third includes extreme violent actions either by 
opposition elements or by the government in response to such opposition, such as guerilla 
warfare, assassinations, and purges.11  We then sum, by category, the number of unstable 
events that occurred in each country over a 5 year period.  As our three dimensions of 
political instability are likely to be highly correlated, we then take the principal 
component of these three categories as our measure of political instability.12  
Table 1 shows the average (and ranking) of our index of political instability for 
the individual countries in our sample, where larger numbers are associated with greater 
instability.  Based on our measure of instability, the four most unstable countries are 
Argentina, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Colombia while the four most stable are Panama, 
Honduras, Paraguay, and Costa Rica.  While the unstable group had at least twice as 
many unstable events as the stable group in each individual measure of instability 
(assassinations, coups, crises, demonstrations, guerilla action, purges, revolutions, riots, 
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and strikes), the differential was especially great in the case of assassinations and 
guerrilla warfare.  The unstable group had a total of 231 assassinations during the sample 
period and 62 instances of guerrilla warfare, while the stable group experienced a sum of 
35 assassinations and 7 instances of guerrilla warfare.13  Argentina and Guatemala each 
experienced around 200 events of political instability from 1971-2000.  Of those two 
hundred events, 124 of them in Argentina revealed citizen discontent, while 125 of them 
in Guatemala consisted of extreme violence.   
 While most empirical studies of political instability focus on the effects of 
instability on investment or growth, several studies investigate the factors important 
explaining political instability.  In the paragraphs below, we discuss the variables most 
emphasized in this literature. Table 3 provides a more detailed description of all the 
variables used in the estimation and their sources, while Table 4 provides summary 
statistics.  
 
A.  Democracy, Factionalism, and Regime Duration 
Many studies highlight the importance of regime type to political stability. 
Ellingsen (2000) and Parsa (2003) argue that democratic regimes tend to experience less 
political instability than undemocratic regimes because they allow citizens to participate 
in the political process.  By allowing political participation, violence will be less likely to 
arise in democratic regimes because conflict can be solved through voting and consensus 
(Rummel (1995)).  Auvinen (1997) and Przeworski & Limongi (1997) also point out that 
democracies divert resources from investment to consumption, which allows democratic 
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regimes to provide more economic and political goods, thus alleviating deprivation and 
discontent.   
Feng (1997), in a sample of 96 countries from 1960 to 1980, presents evidence of 
a positive relationship between democracy and stability.  More recently, although 
Goldstone et.al. (2004) find that democracy is one of the most important factors behind 
political stability around the world, they show that weak and factionalized democracies 
are some of the most unstable types of regimes.   In a study restricted to Latin American 
countries, Schatzman (2005) finds mixed results for the relationship between democracy 
and stability, depending on the measure of stability.  Specifically, she finds that countries 
with more democratic regimes are less likely to experience collective protests, but more 
likely to experience rebellions.  
To measure democracy, we construct five-year averages of POLITY2, a variable 
obtained from the Polity IV Project.  POLITY2 is equal to a country’s democracy score 
less its autocracy score.  Since the underlying variables range from 0 to 10, POLITY2 has 
a range of -10 and 10, where higher values represent stronger democracy.  We also 
include two other regime measures.  The first is a dummy variable that accounts for the 
presence of factionalism, where factionalism is defined by the Polity IV dataset as 
“polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for 
political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to 
the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.”14  We take the average 
factional score for each five year period as a measure of particularist politics. 
The second is a measure of regime durability and it is measured the year before 
each 5 year period.  It is defined as the number of years that a country has not undergone 
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a significant regime change, defined by the Polity IV as a 3 point move in a country’s 
democracy score.  Countries which have remained consistently democratic or autocratic 
during the sample may be less likely to experience a drastic change in regime.  We also 
interact this with a democracy dummy which is equal to one when POLITY2 is greater 
than 0.  In this way, we can also determine if durability matters across regime types. 
 
B. Neighborhood Instability 
Political instability can be contagious since revolutionary groups and ideologies 
can cross borders. Countries in “bad neighborhoods” might suffer from neighboring 
instability, especially if that instability causes a flood of refugees into the country or if 
guerilla armies use a country as a base from which to attack their home country. 
Goldstone et.al. (2004)  find that countries with four or more political unstable neighbors 
are more likely to experience political instability, while Schatzman (2005) finds that 
political instability in neighboring countries increases the probability of a country 
experiencing collective protests.15   We create a variable that is equal to the number of 
neighbor countries that experienced political instability during each five-year period.  We 
follow Goldstone et.al.’s approach and consider a country as politically unstable if there 
was either an ethnic conflict or a revolutionary war during the year, since these are the 
types of instability that are most likely to affect neighboring countries.   Figure 1 
illustrates the “bad neighborhoods” in Latin America and shows that countries in trouble 
tend to be clustered in the same region.  There are two main blocs: the first is in Central 
America and includes Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua; the second is in 
northwestern South America and includes Colombia and Peru.      
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C.  Inequality 
Eckstein & Wickham-Crowley (2003) and Oxhorn (2003) provide evidence that 
the increase in democracy in Latin America has come without an improvement in the 
distribution of income, and that income disparity may be threatening stability in the 
region.  Inequality is considered a significant explanatory variable of political instability 
because, at least in part, inequality in education, skill, income, and wealth creates an 
uncertain environment where it is difficult to promote democracy, and low democracy 
has been associated with high political instability (Tulchin & Brown (2002)).  Acemoglu 
& Robinson (2006) develop a theoretical model of democracy and income inequality and 
argue that high income inequality in Latin America is one of the main causes of weak 
democracy in the region.  According to Acemoglu & Robinson (2006), the elite will be 
against democracy in highly unequal societies because a democratic system will impose 
more redistributive policies.  In addition, Perotti (1996) and Auvinen & Nafziger (2002) 
argue that an unequal distribution of income will produce social discontent, since 
individuals will perceive that income is unfairly distributed, leading to manifestations and 
uprisings.16  Empirically, Alesina & Perotti (1996), Perotti (1996), and Odedokun & 
Round (2001) show that countries with high income inequality are more likely to be 
politically unstable.17  
To determine the effect of income inequality on the political environment, we 
create two dummy variables representing countries with high and low levels of income 
inequality.  To create these dummy variables, we first calculated the mean of the Gini 
coefficient (from 1971 to 2000) for all the countries in the sample.18  The high (low) 
inequality dummy variable is equal to one for those countries that have an average Gini 
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coefficient of one standard deviation above (below) the sample mean.  As shown in Table 
1, the most unequal countries in our sample are Guatemala, Peru, the Dominican 
Republic, and Bolivia.  The least unequal are Paraguay, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and 
Nicaragua.19  It is interesting to note that, except the Dominican Republic, all of the 
highly unequal countries are also in the high instability sample.  Likewise, two of the 
most politically stable countries also have the least amount of income inequality (Costa 
Rica and Paraguay). 
       
D.  Other socio-demographic conditions 
Other variables, such as ethnic fractionalization, economic discrimination of 
ethnic minorities, and urbanization growth are relevant determinants of political 
instability.20  Specifically, Annett (2000), Auvinen & Nafziger (2002), Collier & Hoeffler 
(2004), and Ellingsen (2000) show that ethnic fractionalization has a positive and 
significant effect on instability levels.  Auvinen & Nafziger (2002), on the other hand, 
argue that ethnic fractionalization is not a sufficient condition for political instability 
since ethnic antagonism does not necessarily exists in highly fractionalized societies.21  
Auvinen & Nafziger (2002), Ellingsen (2000), and Goldstone et.al. (2005) claim that 
economic discrimination of ethnic minorities is what leads to political instability because 
those groups that are discriminated against will rebel against the system. 
     While urbanization growth has also been considered in explanation of political 
instability, there is no consensus on how urbanization rates affect political instability.  
For example, Collier & Hoeffler (2004) argue that the rate of urbanization is low during 
periods of instability, and that this negative relationship is due to the fact that a 
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government has better military capability in a highly urbanized country than in a less 
urbanized country.  With low urbanization rates, the population is dispersed and it is 
difficult for the government to contain instability.  On the other hand, Auvinen (1997) 
and Annett (2000) argue that urbanization tends to promote more political instability.  
High urbanization rates promote more instability because it is difficult for the 
government to provide basic services in highly populated cities, which creates popular 
discontent.   
      To investigate the effect of these socio-economic factors on instability, we include the 
number of years of the five year period in which there is at least one group that 
experiences economic discrimination, ethnic fractionalization (and its square), and the 
average urbanization growth rate for each five-year period.22   
 
D.  Macroeconomic factors 
While the majority of papers on political instability investigate the effects of 
instability on growth or investment, several models study the possibility that economic 
variables help explain instability.  Poor economic performance has been considered as a 
major cause of political instability for two reasons.  First, when income is low (or 
falling), the opportunity cost for an individual to rise up, protest, or revolt is low (Collier 
& Hoeffler (2004)).  Individuals have an incentive to quit their participation in productive 
activities and take part in protests and insurrections (Grossman (1991)).  Second, poor 
economic conditions increase deprivation, which will fuel political instability as citizens 
perceive their government to be incompetent (Auvinen & Nafziger (1999), Ellingsen 
(2000), and Posner (1997)).  Goldstone et.al. (2005) use infant mortality as a measure of 
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the standard of living and find that this variable is one of the best overall predictors of 
political instability around the world.23  In addition, Cuzan et.al. (1988), Annett (2000), 
and Blomberg & Hess (2002) and Booth (1991) show that low income growth has a 
positive effect on instability.24
Many papers study the effect of political instability on inflation rates, but less 
have investigated the possibility that high (or volatile) inflation may destabilize polities.  
Cukierman et.al. (1992) find in a sample of 79 countries that politically weak 
governments are more likely to resort to seignorage.  Paldam (1987) focuses on eight 
Latin American countries from 1946-83 and shows that the causality between inflation 
and instability work both ways.  He goes on to demonstrate that almost no regime in the 
region has survived a bout of hyperinflation, a trend that still holds in the region.  Of the 
countries with the highest and most volatile inflations, almost all were forced out of 
power (either by a coup d’etat or by the military leaving in disgrace, as was the case of 
Argentina in the early 1980s and Brazil in the mid-1980s).   
 Besides inflation itself, government spending may be a stabilizing or destabilizing 
factor, depending on how the spending is financed.  Annett (2000) finds that an increase 
in government spending is associated with lower levels of political instability, while 
Cuzan et.al. (1988) find that an increase in government spending increases political 
instability in Latin American countries.   
 Lastly, Goldstone et.al. (2005) and Donovan et.al. (2005) discuss the possibility 
that trade openness might have on political instability.  Goldstone et.al. note that 
“countries with lower trade openness (at the 25th percentile in the global distribution) had 
roughly two to three times higher odds of near-term instability than countries with higher 
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openness to trade (those at the 75th percentile).”  Donovan et.al. argue that trade openness 
may be negatively associated with instability if openness brings about more economic 
growth.  They also note that openness increases a country’s contact with outsiders, which 
may stimulate productivity growth and improve domestic institutions. 
To investigate the effects of macroeconomic variables on instability in the region, 
we include the share of investment as a percentage of GDP, the standard deviation of 
inflation (as a measure of inflation volatility), the share of the government budget deficit 
as a percentage of GDP, and openness to trade.25   All of these variables are constructed 
in five-year averages. However, since there may be a reverse causality issue between 
them and political instability, we use the first lag in each case.   
 
IV.   Results 
In this section, we test in a panel of 18 Latin American countries whether the 
variables discussed above significantly influence political instability.  We use Ordinary 
Least Squares and White robust standard errors for all estimations.  Unless otherwise 
noted, all of the data is averaged into 5 year periods, allowing us to capture information 
from both average cross country differences and fluctuations over time.26   
Column 1 of Table 5 presents our results and shows that the model explains 46 
percent of the variation in the instability index.  One of the most interesting results from 
column 1 is that the regime type and durability significantly affect instability levels in the 
region. The coefficient on POLITY2 is negative and significant at the .01 level, meaning 
that countries with higher levels of democracy in the five-year period have lower levels 
of instability on average.  The quantitative effect of democracy is not quantitatively large; 
 13
 
a one standard deviation increase in POLITY2 (equal to 6.09) is associated with a .36 
point decrease in the political instability index (which is equal to almost one-third of a 
standard deviation). 
 The coefficient on the factional dummy is positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level, supporting Goldstone et.al.’s (2005) findings that factionalized political regimes 
are also more unstable on average.  The quantitative effect of factionalism on instability 
is slightly larger than the effect of the POLITY2 variable, but it is still small.  A one 
standard deviation increase in factionalism (equal to .36) is associated with a .44 point 
increase in the political instability index. 
To determine the effect of regime durability on political instability, we also want 
to control for the possibility that different regime types may have different effects on 
political instability.  For this reason, we include in our model an interaction term of the 
duration of a regime and a dummy equal to one for democratic countries.27  We find that 
the coefficient on durability is negative and weakly significant, but that the interaction 
term is positive and significant at the .01 level.  These results imply that new autocratic 
regimes are more likely to face political instability in the subsequent five-year period 
than more established ones.   
 Somewhat surprisingly, the results also indicate that older democracies also face 
higher instability levels than equally established autocracies.  One possible reason for this 
finding is the fact that individuals in a democratic regime have more opportunity to 
express their discontent through non-violent demonstrations.  Since our index of political 
instability includes demonstrations and strikes, our finding supports the view that under 
democracies the dynamic between the government and society may be different.28   
 14
 
 Unlike the results in Goldstone et.al. (2005) and Schatzman (2005), we find no 
evidence of regional contagion in the region.    We also find no significant correlation 
between economic discrimination of minorities and instability.  We do show, however, 
that overall ethnic diversity does matter for instability.  Column 1 shows that the ethnic 
fractionalization index has a significant negative effect on instability at the 10 percent 
level, while the square of this index has a significant positive effect on political instability 
at the 1 percent level.  Figure 2 graphs the non-linear relationship between ethnic 
diversity and instability that we find.  Increases in diversity lower instability until the 
fractionalization index reaches .33, at which point any further ethnic diversity increases 
average instability levels.  The range of diversity in Latin America is from about .17 
(Paraguay) to .74 (Bolivia). Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay all have diversity rankings to the left of the turning point, while 
the rest of the sample have diversity levels associated with higher levels of instability. 
 Income inequality also has an important affect on instability levels in the region.  
The coefficients on the high and low inequality dummies are statistically negative and 
significant at the .01 level.  Countries with low income inequality have an average of 1.07 
points less on our index of political instability than countries with medium levels of 
inequality.  Thus, the effect of low inequality is both statistically and quantitatively 
important (1.07 is close to one standard deviation in the instability index), supporting 
Alesina & Perotti’s (1996) finding.  Nonetheless, our estimation shows that countries 
with high income inequality have an index of political instability below 0.54 points than 
countries with medium levels of income inequality.  This finding supports Acemoglu & 
 15
 
Robinson’s (2006) model of the relationship by showing that the effect of income 
inequality on political instability is not a linear function of the Gini coefficient.  
        Of the different macroeconomic variables discussed in the previous section, only 
trade openness is consistently significant.  Neither the level nor the standard deviation of 
inflation are statistically significant (we report only the results of using the standard 
deviation for reasons of space), nor is government deficit share.  Investment as a 
percentage of GDP is negative and significant at the .10 level, meaning that countries 
which invested more in the previous five-year period have less instability in the current 
period.  Trade openness is positive and significant at the .01 level, indicating that an 
increase in openness by one standard deviation in the previous five-year period is 
associated with a .35 point decrease in the instability index.  This result supports 
Goldstone et.al.’s (2005) finding that trade openness was negatively related to instability 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 Lastly, the results in column 1 show that urbanization growth rate is negative and 
significant at the .01 level.  This finding is especially interesting since there are two 
contrasting views in the literature on urbanization and instability.  Our finding provides 
support for the argument that urbanization can helped to promote political stability 
(Collier’s & Hoeffler (2004)). Specifically, we find that one standard deviation increase 
in the urbanization growth rate (equal to 3.243) is associated with a drop in the political 
instability index of .42 points.  
 For robustness purposes, we re-estimate the model and exclude the variables that 
are not significant at least at the 10 percent level (neighborhood conflict, economic 
discrimination, the standard deviation of inflation, and the government deficit share).  We 
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perform an F test and find that we cannot reject (at the 5 percent level) the hypothesis that 
these variables as a group do not explain significantly political instability.  Column 3 of 
Table 5 shows the results from this estimation.  The results are almost identical to that of 
column 1, with the exceptions that the coefficient on ethnic fractionalization is now 
significant at the .05 level instead of the .10 level and the coefficient of the interaction 
term between the regime durability variable and the democracy dummy is now significant 
at the .05 level instead of the .01 level.  
In addition, we re-estimate our model using a different measure of democracy.  
Here we measure democracy as the five year average of the democracy score (DEMOC) 
provided by the Polity IV dataset.  The variable ranges from 0 to 10 and it measures the 
degree of openness of political institutions.29  Like the POLITY2 variable, higher values 
of DEMOC are associated with higher levels of democracy. Using this new measure of 
democracy, column 2 of Table 5 shows the estimates of the full model.  Column 4 of 
Table 5 shows the estimates of the restricted model that excludes those variables that are 
not significant as group based on the F test. 
The results are very similar to the previous results.  For example, the coefficient 
on democracy is negative and statistically significant at the .01 level.  The coefficient on 
the democracy score indicates that an increase on democracy of one standard deviation 
(equal to 3.56) is associated with a .39 point decrease in the political instability index, 
which is very close to the estimate when we use the polity score (POLITY2) as a measure 
of democracy.  Although results obtained from this estimation are very similar to 
previous results, there are some slight differences.  The coefficient on factionalism 
becomes is now significant at .05 level instead of .01 level, ethnic fractionalization 
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becomes significant at the .05 level instead of .10 level, and the investment share is now 
insignificantly different from zero.30   
 
V.   Discussion 
In this paper, we investigate the main factors behind political instability in 18 
Latin American countries from 1971 to 2000.  We estimate a model of instability for the 
region, including variables such as regime type and durability, income inequality, ethnic 
diversity, ethnic discrimination, regional spillover effects, urbanization growth, and a 
host of macroeconomic variables.  We find many interesting results.   
First, we show that democracy and factionalism have a significant effect on 
political instability.  Countries with strong democratic regimes suffer less political 
instability on average, while countries with factional regimes experience higher average 
political instability.  In addition, we show that regime durability has a negative effect on 
instability, although long lived democracies are more vulnerable than long lived 
autocracies. These findings are important because they highlight the need to establish the 
institutions and policies to promote strong democracies in Latin American countries, and 
also the possibility of future research on regime durability and democracy in the region. 
We also find that the low income inequality dummy has a significant negative 
effect on political instability, meaning that policies which promote a more equal 
distribution of income may have a side benefit of lowering overall political instability.  
For instance, while the promotion of a more egalitarian society through taxation may not 
be feasible (or popular) in the region, policy-makers could promote income equality 
through education.  Our estimates show that ethnic fractionalization is partly behind high 
 18
 
political instability in Latin America, and that highly fractionalized countries will tend to 
experience more political instability.  This highlights the importance of establishing 
institutions that incorporate individuals from diverse ethnic groups in the political process 
with the purpose to promote more stability.    
The demographic composition of a country is also important, since more 
urbanization seems to be associated with lower levels of political instability.  Policies 
related to urbanizing and incorporating rural regions into to the national economy can 
also be used to promote stability in the region.   Lastly, while many of the 
macroeconomic variables were insignificantly related to instability, we show that 
openness to trade is negatively and significantly associated with political instability.  
Although Latin American countries have already significantly decreased their barriers to 
international trade, these results suggest that further trade liberalization will promote 
more political stability in the region. 
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Table 1 
 Political Instability, Democracy, and Income Inequality Averages (1971 – 2000)  
 
              
  
Political 
Instability 
PI 
Ranking 
# of  
Events 
PI Events 
Ranking 
Polity 2 
Score 
Polity2 
Ranking 
Gini 
Coeff. 
Gini 
Ranking 
Argentina  2.270 1 218 1 2.433 9 43.954 12 
Bolivia  1.535 5 136 7 3.233 7 47.489 4 
Brazil  0.477 11 81 11 1.900 11 47.024 5 
Chile  1.343 7 155 5 0.267 14 45.491 8 
Colombia  1.630 4 168 3 7.833 3 44.152 11 
Costa Rica  -0.278 18 16 18 10.000 1 41.285 17 
Dom. Rep. 0.333 15 72 12 4.167 5 47.505 3 
Ecuador  0.811 10 86 10 5.167 4 45.050 9 
El Salvador  1.469 6 154 6 3.167 8 45.013 10 
Guatemala  1.941 2 195 2 0.667 13 48.933 1 
Honduras  0.471 12 72 13 3.633 6 45.796 7 
Mexico  1.059 8 119 8 -1.033 17 42.930 14 
Nicaragua  0.856 9 94 9 -0.233 15 41.942 15 
Panama  0.365 14 58 15 -0.467 16 46.729 6 
Paraguay  0.016 17 36 17 -2.533 18 40.109 18 
Peru  1.766 3 157 4 1.433 12 48.158 2 
Uruguay  0.294 16 58 16 2.233 10 41.751 16 
Venezuela  0.436 13 65 14 8.633 2 43.919 13 
Table 2 
Description of the Components of Instability 
 
Variable Defined by the Cross-National Time Series Data Archive As: 
Coup d’etat “The number of extraconstitutional or forced changes in the top 
government elite and/or its effective control of the nation's power structure 
in a given year.  The term ‘coup’ includes, but is not exhausted by, the 
term ‘successful revolution’.  Unsuccessful coups are not counted.” 
 
Assassination “Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high 
government official or politician.” 
 
General Strike “Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves 
more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies 
or authority.” 
 
Guerrilla Warfare “Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent 
bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the 
present regime.” 
 
Government Crisis “Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of 
the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such 
overthrow.” 
 
Purge “Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition 
within the ranks of the regime or the opposition.” 
 
Riot “Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving 
the use of physical force.” 
 
Revolution “Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt 
at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose 
aim is independence from the central government.” 
 
Anti-Government 
Demonstration 
“Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary 
purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies 
or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.” 
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Table 3 
Description of the Independent Variables 
 
Variable Description 
Democracy Combined polity score (POLITY2) computed by subtracting the 
autocracy score from the democracy score.  Source: Polity IV Project. 
 
Democracy (alternative measure) Democracy score (DEMOC) measures the general openness of 
political institutions.  Source: Polity IV Project. 
 
Economic discrimination Number of years in the 5 year period that a country has had state-led 
economic discrimination against at least one group, measured as a 4 on 
the economic discrimination index.  Source: Minority at Risk Dataset. 
 
Ethnic fractionalization Ethnic fractionalization index.  Source: Alesina et.al. (2003) Dataset. 
 
Factionalism Political competition score (POLCOMP) that combines the regulation 
and competitiveness of participation scores.  Source: Polity IV Project. 
 
Government budget deficit as a 
share of GDP 
The percentage of government budget in nominal prices (government 
expenditure minus government revenue).  Source: OXLAD. 
 
Inequality dummies High (low) inequality dummy equal to 1 if a country has an average 
Gini coefficient one standard deviation above (below) the world mean.  
Source: University of Texas Inequality Project. 
 
Inflation  The level and standard deviation of inflation in the 5 year period.  
Inflation calculated using the GDP deflator.  Source: World Bank 
Development Indicators. 
 
Investment share of GDP The percentage of GDP that comes from investment.  Source: Penn 
World Tables 6.2. 
 
Neighborhood conflict Number of neighbor countries that experienced either an ethnic 
conflict or a revolutionary war.  Source: Political Instability Task 
Force Dataset. 
 
Regime durability Number of years a country has had a particular regime (DURABLE).  
Source: Polity IV Dataset. 
 
Trade Openness Openness is equal to exports plus imports divided by real GDP 
(Laspeyres method). Source: Penn World Tables 6.2. 
 
Urban population growth Growth of the percentage of the total population that live in urban 
areas.  Source: Oxford Latin American Economic History Database 
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics 
 
   Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
Democracy (POLITY2) 2.806 5.800 6.087 
Democracy (DEMOC) 4.955 6.000 3.537 
Economic discrimination 1.509 0.000 2.177 
Ethnic discrimination 0.427 0.491 0.187 
Ethnic discrimination2 0.217 0.241 0.159 
Factionalism 0.204 0.000 0.360 
Government deficit share -0.299 -0.014 2.838 
High inequality 0.222 0.000 0.418 
Standard Deviation of Inflation 195.825 8.593 808.505 
Investment share 14.911 14.556 5.407 
Low inequality 0.222 0.000 0.418 
Neighborhood conflict 0.667 1.000 0.749 
Openness 48.005 39.282 35.707 
Political instability 0.933 0.596 1.202 
Regime durability 12.685 6.500 16.133 
Regime durability* Democracy 8.241 1.000 15.378 
Urbanization growth 5.013 4.124 3.243 
All variables have 108 observations 
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Table 5 
Dependent Variable: Political instability 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Constant 3.23 3.63 3.40 3.76 
 (5.91) (6.81) (5.77) (6.08) 
Democracy* -0.06a -0.11a -0.06a -0.10a
 (5.34) (3.95) (8.30) (6.27) 
Factionalism 1.23a 1.15b 1.30a 1.22a
 (2.53) (2.40) (2.94) (2.79) 
Regime durability -0.01c -0.01c -0.01c -0.01a
 (1.83) (1.88) (1.74) (2.52) 
Regime durability * democracy 0.02a 0.02a 0.02b 0.02a
 (2.65) (2.75) (2.04) (2.63) 
Neighborhood conflict 0.05 0.03 ** ** 
 (0.41) (0.25)   
Low inequality dummy -1.07a -1.01a -1.15a -1.08a
 (3.19) (3.09) (3.96) (3.87) 
High inequality dummy -0.54a -0.56a -0.55a -0.55a
 (3.46) (3.66) (3.35) (3.41) 
Economic Discrimination 0.02 0.03 ** ** 
 (0.88) (0.99)   
Ethnic Fractionalization -4.97c -5.49b -5.23b -5.61b
 (1.87) (1.99) (2.22) (2.24) 
Ethnic Fractionalization2 7.67a 8.34a 8.06a 8.52a
 (2.93) (3.04) (3.55) (3.51) 
Urbanization -0.13a -0.13a -0.13a -0.13a
 (5.58) (5.61) (5.94) (5.99) 
Standard Deviation of Inflation 0.0001 0.0001 ** ** 
 (1.61) (1.43)   
Investment share t-1 -0.05c -0.05 -0.05c -0.05 
 (1.71) (1.63) (1.73) (1.63) 
Government deficit share t-1 0.02 0.02 ** ** 
 (0.93) (1.07)   
Trade Openness t-1 -0.01a -0.01a -0.01a -0.01a
 (2.92) (2.89) (2.66) (2.89) 
R-squared 0.465 0.466 0.454 0.456 
Observations 108 108 108 108 
t-statistics in parentheses use White’s robust standard errors. a, b, and c represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent level, respectively.  *Democracy is measured with the POLITY2 variable in columns 1 & 3 and with 
the DEMOC variable in columns 2 &4. 
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Figure 1 
Bad Neighborhoods in Latin America (1971-2000) 
 
 
 
Source: www.ftaaconsulting.com/images/map.gif 
*Bad neighborhoods in red (modification)  
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Figure 2 
The Effect of Ethnic Diversity on Political Instability 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The statistic is from Goldstone et.al. (2005).   
 
2 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. 
 
3   Our measure here of democracy is any country with an average POLITY2 score above zero for 
the 6 five-year periods in our panel.  See Table 3 for a definition of the POLITY2 measure.   
 
4 Even though the majority of Latin American countries undertook democratic reforms in the 
1980s and 90s that promoted stability,  Foran (2005) and Wickham-Crowley (2001) argue that the 
region will continue to experience political instability in the future.  
 
5 Grier & Tullock (1989) demonstrate the importance of testing the validity of pooling data from 
large samples of countries together in a single growth equation.  They show that the coefficients 
in the growth equation are significantly different across different sub-samples and cannot be 
appropriate pooled.  Block’s (2001) work also provides evidence on the idea that critical slope 
terms are different for different sub-samples.   
 
6 For the effects of instability on economic development, see Hibbs (1973), Benhabib & Spiegel 
(1997), Benhabib & Rustichini (1996), Edwards (1996), Gyimah-Brempong & Traynor (1996) 
and Alesina & Perotti (1996). 
 
7  See McDonald & Siegel (1986), Majd & Pindyck (1987), Bernanke (1983) and Cukierman 
(1980), and Stewart & Venieris (1985). 
 
8  De Melo et.al. (1996) and Knight et.al. (1996) both confirm the damaging effect civil war has 
on a country’s capital stock. 
 
9 It has been argued that the direction of causality could run the other direction, where low growth 
rates make political instability more likely.  Campos & Nugent (2003) use a Granger causality 
test to determine the direction of causality between political instability and investment.  They find 
in a sample of developing countries that the causality goes from political instability to capital 
accumulation and not vice versa.  Londregan & Poole (1990), on the other hand, find no evidence 
of a relationship between political instability and investment.  
 
10 Political instability is considered by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) as one of the dimensions of 
governance, and they define governance as "the traditions and institutions by which the authority 
is exercised, the process by which governments are elected and monitored, and the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies" (p.176). 
 
11  See Table 2 for a detailed definition of all of these variables. 
 
12 The first principal component explains 55.9% of the variance of instability, while the 
first and second components cumulatively explain 81.2% of the variance.  Since the first 
component explains more than half of the variation in the series, we use it as our measure 
of political instability.  Since we want to have a measure of political instability and not a 
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measure of political stability, our measure of political instability is equal to one minus the 
principal component of these three variables.   
 
13 There were 8 coups d’etat, 41 government crises, 142 anti-government demonstrations, 16 
purges, 53 revolutions, 70 riots, and 94 general strikes in the unstable group.  The numbers in the 
4 most stable countries were 4 coups d’etat, 12 government crises, 71 anti-government 
demonstrations, 3 purges, 11 revolutions, 13 riots, and 26 general strikes. 
 
14 According to the Polity IV, factional regimes also must have the following electoral 
participation characteristics:  “There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which 
compete for political influence at the national level–parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not 
necessarily elected–but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests.” 
 
15   On the other hand, she finds that regional instability decreases the probability of rebellions in 
the domestic country.  
 
16  Likewise, Parsa (2003), Eckstein & Wickham-Crawley (2003), and Oxhorn (2003) argue that 
high income inequality in Latin America promotes political instability in the region.  
 
17   However, in a sample restricted to Sub-Saharan countries, Nel (2003) finds that income 
inequality has a significant effect on investors’ perceptions about the political environment but 
not a significant effect on political instability.  
 
18  We use the Estimated Household Income Inequality (EHII) measure created by Galbraith & 
Kum (2004) and provided by the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP).   
 
19 The remaining 10 countries are those with levels of income inequality in the medium range, 
and we consider those as the control group in our analysis.  
 
20 Alesina & Perotti (1996) also use primary school enrollment rates as an explanatory variable of 
political instability and find that education has a significant negative effect on political instability.      
Collier & Hoeffler (2004) use the male secondary enrollment rate as an explanatory variable, 
arguing that the variable reflects the opportunity cost of rebellion.  We do not include education 
in our specification because we found no significant relationship between it and political 
instability in any of our estimations. 
 
21 Easterly & Levine (1997) also use ethnic fractionalization as an explanatory variable of 
political instability but find that it is not significant. 
 
22   It is possible that the effect of fractionalization is non-linear, where highly homogenous 
societies and highly diverse ones are both associated with more stability. 
 
23   We do not include infant mortality as an explanatory variable in our model because we found 
that it has no significant effect for the Latin American countries.  
  
24  Investment rates are also thought to be important to political stability.  For instance, 
investment and instability are simultaneously determined in Alesina & Perotti’s (1996) model.  In 
our estimation we do not include the real GDP growth because we find that it is not statistically 
significant.   
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25   The investment share and openness to trade variables were obtained from the Penn World 
Tables 6.2.  The government deficit was estimated using data provided by the Oxford Latin 
American Economic History Database (OXLAD).  See Table 2 for an explanation of how 
government deficit as share of GDP was constructed. 
 
26   See Grier & Tullock (1989) for a justification of using 5 year intervals instead of averaging 
over long periods. 
 
27 Countries are considered as democracies if they have an average POLITY2 score greater than 
zero. 
 
28   This result suggests further study on how the dynamics between government and society have 
evolved in democratic regimes in Latin America.    
 
29 For this variable, observations with codes -88 and -77 were eliminated since they indicate a 
transition period or a period in which there is a collapse of central political authority.  Few 
observations had these codes and the 5 year averages were constructed with the remaining 
observations.      
 
30 Although investment share becomes insignificant, an F test shows that this variable should not 
be eliminated from the estimation of the restricted model.   
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